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This study sought the opinions of a select group of professionals, trained in medicine and law concerning: professional privilege; 
management of patients who posed risks to society; and the legal charge to impose upon a patient with uncontrolled epilepsy 
who caused a fatality by driving contrary to medical advice. 
The second Academic Seminar of the Australian College of Legal Medicine was surveyed to define demographics and opinions. 
Of 23 respondents, 14 were trained in law and medicine, of whom eight had post graduate medical qualifications and seven 
had more than basic legal training; 20/23 supported professional privilege in medicine but l8/23 denied its absoluteness; 22/23 
felt the doctor had a right to divulge information in the public interest. Only l4/23 (although still a majority opinion) felt this 
right was a duty and 6/23 refuted the same. When concerned regarding compliance not to drive, 7/23 would discuss it with 
family/friends in contravention of patient consent, l2/23 would report to the driving authorities where concern became fact, 
l3/23 would advise the patient that a report would be sent, 4/23 would report without the patient’s knowledge and four would 
threaten but not send the report. In the case of a fatality consequent to non-compliance, 10123 considered murder and 22123 
considered manslaughter charges to be appropriate. 
The majority supported professional privilege in the doctor/patient relationship but also supported the right or even a duty to 
report risks to society. Where a concern arose that a patient with epilepsy may drive contrary to advice, one-third of doctors would 
discuss with family/friends, without consent, one-half would report the patient to the driving authorities, while almost three- 
quarters would report the patient if concern was realised. Murder and manslaughter, serious charges, were deemed appropriate 
for patients who caused death by driving against medical advice. 
Key MWds: law; epilepsy; driving; confidentiality; reporting; legal-charge. 
INTRODUCTION 
The code of conduct, as prepared by the Royal Aus- 
tralian College of Physicians (RACP), clearly states: 
The principle of confidentiality is funda- 
mental to the relationship between doctor 
and patient. Respect for confidentiality, as 
with consent, gives expression to the pa- 
tient’s autonomy by acknowledging that it 
is the patient who controls any information 
relating to his or her medical condition or 
treatment. Medical information should not 
be divulged by a physician except with the 
consent of the patient’. 
The RACP acknowledged the need for consideration 
of 
overriding public interest particularly 
within the domain of driving and further 
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accepted there exist _ . statutory provi- 
sions that permit or compel the physician 
to breach patient confidentiality. 
The guidelines went on to state that, 
[I]n all cases the patient should be told that 
the physician intends to make the disclo- 
sure and the reasons for this decision. 
In the same publication, under the rubric of ‘Litiga- 
tion and the Fear of Litigation’ the RACP guidelines 
on ethics stated: 
They [meaning responses in the face of 
need to seek advice when in doubt] should 
always involve the patient and, where ap- 
propriate the patient’s family or agent 
in decisions regarding management, with 
due consideration of perceived risks and 
benefits. 
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Privacy was the focus of the first academic meeting 
of the newly incorporated Australian College of Legal 
Medicine (ACLM). At that meeting there was a survey 
conducted to examine questions of professional privi- 
lege and legal liability with respect to the doctor/patient 
relationship, driving and patients with epilepsy’. The 
majority recognised the need for professional privilege 
but also felt that the doctor had a duty to report patients 
who posed a risk to the community. Acknowledging 
that it was a small but highly qualified sample, com- 
prising doctors with legal training, a significant minor- 
ity objected to the concept of a ‘duty’ to report such 
patients, as contrasted with a ‘right’ to so act. That 
survey did not examine what respondents would do if 
faced with the dilemma of treating a patient who had 
uncontrolled epilepsy but for whom it was apparent 
that the medical advice, not to drive, was potentially or 
actually being ignored. 
As ‘Epilepsy and the Law’ was one of the main top- 
ics of the 21st International Epilepsy Congress (IEC) 
in Sydney, there was considerable attention focused 
upon ‘Driving and Epilepsy’ with discussions which 
reported practices in various countries and the im- 
pact that this had for the doctor/patient relationship3-6. 
McLachlan6.7 examined the practices of Canadian neu- 
rologists, as regards reporting, with special reference 
to the dichotomy of states which either mandated com- 
pulsory reporting or did not do so. Black and Lai’. lo ex- 
amined the situation in South Australia. the only Aus- 
tralian state which, in strict application of Section 148 
of The Road Traffic Act (1973). has legislated for com- 
pulsory reporting of people with epilepsy who drive and 
hence pose a risk. 
The second academic seminar of the ACLM” fo- 
cused upon road trauma and the medico-legal and 
forensic implications related to the same. The paper 
that follows reports the findings of a survey, conducted 
at the conclusion of that meeting, which further ex- 
plored the attitudes of the participants towards ques- 
tions of professional privilege for the medical profes- 
sion. It also sought to define what respondents would 
do in the face of treating non-compliant patients who 
ignored medical advice not to drive. Further, it ques- 
tioned what should be the legal consequences for such 
patients if they caused a fatality as a result of such 
non-compliance. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
At the conclusion of the second academic seminar of 
the ACLM, which focused upon road trauma, a survey 
was conducted of the participants, to define the demo- 
graphics regarding professional qualifications and the 
nature of their principal practice (be it as a doctor or 
lawyer). 
The survey employed similar questions, as were used 
in the initial study of the first academic seminar of the 
ACLM’, to further examine the attitudes of this pop- 
ulation as regards the extension of professional priv- 
ilege to the doctor/patient relationship. The question- 
naire (see Appendix) also aimed to define the attitudes 
of the participants concerning what should constitute 
the most appropriate response to patients who may not 
understand the concerns of doctors as regards ‘fitness 
to drive’ or for whom it is apparent that the patient will 
continue to drive irrespective of the advice not to do 
so. 
The questionnaire also explored what should be the 
most suitable charge to be legally imposed upon a pa- 
tient for whom it is apparent that he/she was responsible 
for a fatality as a consequence of driving in clear con- 
travention of unequivocal evidence that the doctor had 
advised against the same. 
RESULTS 
Of the 23 respondents, 14 had both medical and le- 
gal qualifications; one was a barrister whose initial de- 
gree was as a pharmacist, seven respondents had only 
medical qualifications and one respondent was a Ph.D. 
scientist, with neither medical nor legal qualifications, 
but who was responsible for the tissue donor service 
at a major Sydney teaching hospital. All those who 
had dual qualifications in medicine and law had first 
graduated in medicine prior to studying law. Three of 
these respondents indicated that they practiced both in 
medicine and law and one who held a postgraduate 
medical qualification (including the Diploma of Ob- 
stetrics and Fellowship of the Royal Australian College 
of General Practitioners) also held an Honours Degree 
in Law and practised as a lawyer rather than as a doc- 
tor. The remainder of those who had dual qualifications 
still considered themselves principally as doctors. Of 
those with both degrees, eight also had post-graduate 
medical qualifications (which included the Colleges of 
Surgeons, Physicians, Pathologists, General Practition- 
ers, and Faculty of Public Health Medicine, together 
with both masters and post-graduate diplomas in areas 
such as Public Health, Obstetrics and Anaesthetics). 
Concurrently, seven of this group also held more than 
basic legal qualifications, with honours’ and masters’ 
degrees. 
Asked if there should be professional privilege be- 
tween doctor and patient, 20123 agreed, two disagreed 
and one was undecided. When considering the extent 
of such privilege, 18/23 felt that it should not be abso- 
lute, 4/23 felt that it should be absolute and again the 
same respondent (a doctor with post-graduate training 
in general practice but no legal qualifications) was un- 
decided. Among those who agreed that professional 
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privilege should be absolute between doctor and pa- 
tient was one of the respondents who worked both as 
a lawyer and doctor, one with dual qualification who 
practised mainly as a doctor, a doctor with only medical 
training and the scientist. 
All respondents, except one with dual qualification, 
agreed that doctors should have the right to report pa- 
tients who posed a risk. 
When seeking to make such reporting a duty, the re- 
sponse was less categorical with 14/23 accepting that 
such a duty existed, 6123 disputed that such was a duty 
and three were undecided. All of the three who were 
undecided had dual qualifications in medicine and law. 
416, who denied the existence of a duty to report pa- 
tients who failed to comply with medical advice not to 
drive, also held dual qualification and this included two 
of the three respondents who practiced both as lawyers 
and doctors. 
In response to an open-ended option for a commen- 
tary, there was repeated acknowledgement of the need 
for the patients to ‘be able to freely communicate with 
their medical adviser without fear of any of this confi- 
dential information being divulged’. One respondent, 
who qualified the difference between a ‘right’ and a 
‘duty’, as regards to reporting, indicated the need for 
specified limits set as a matter of public 
policy and clearly justifiable as being in 
the public interest with health and welfare 
of the community being the paramount 
consideration. 
These sentiments were echoed by others, with the sug- 
gestion that the area of confidentiality and privilege 
needed to be included within the training provided to 
doctors in their undergraduate curriculum. 
One respondent pointed out that the need for pro- 
fessional privilege in law was necessary for the bet- 
ter function of law but the same was not necessary in 
medicine. This respondent practised both as a lawyer 
and doctor. In contrast, another respondent, who also 
practised as both a lawyer and doctor, felt that privilege 
helped both disciplines to function better but that the 
needs were different. 
It was acknowledged that there was a need to pro- 
vide protection for doctors who did breach confiden- 
tiality. One respondent suggested that, with some psy- 
chologically disturbed patients, the doctor may place 
him/herself in risk of real physical danger by divulging 
confidential and potentially damaging information. 
When questioned as to the appropriate response to 
take in the situation in which there was concern re- 
garding the patient’s understanding of the doctor’s ad- 
vice not to drive, approximately half the respondents 
(12/23) stated that, in the absence of consent to dis- 
cuss the matter, they would simply report the situa- 
tion to the driving authorities. Seven respondents in- 
dicated that they would discuss the matter with family 
members/friends without the patient’s consent to do so. 
Four indicated that they would only discuss the matter 
with family/friends if there was patient consent and one 
respondent indicated that no further action should be 
taken. 
While the questionnaire clearly asked respondents to 
prioritise their answers and to give a single response, 
two respondents could not choose between discussion 
with family/friends without consent or simply to re- 
port the patient to the driving authorities without the 
patient’s consent. A solitary respondent was undecided 
as to what was the most appropriate action to take. 
Respondents were again given the chance to provide 
additional commentary. One dual-qualified respondent 
identified the need to better educate both patients and 
doctors regarding the necessity to balance competing 
private and public rights. While the question allowed 
for only one response, a South Australian doctor (with 
dual qualifications) pointed out that reporting the pa- 
tient to the driving authorities was mandatory in South 
Australia and stated that he would report the patient as 
a first priority and then might discuss this with fam- 
ily/friends without the patient’s consent. One doctor, 
who was completing a law degree, indicated that, where 
there was concern as regards the patient’s actions, it was 
usually not as a consequence of lack of understanding 
and hence reporting without consent was appropriate. 
A respondent, who practised both as a lawyer and doc- 
tor. wrote: 
as the law stands at present, unfitness to 
drive is not a ‘notifiable’ condition, and to 
do so would expose the doctor to liability 
for breach of confidence. However, unfit- 
ness to drive, for medical reasons, ought to 
be made notifiable, with protection of the 
doctor for disclosure, in order to meet the 
doctor’s higher duty to society as a whole. 
This respondent indicated that he would take no fur- 
ther action in the face of concern that a patient did not 
understand advice against driving. 
Another dual-qualified doctor suggested that prob- 
lems may arise by discussing the patient with fam- 
ily/friends without consent but that no such issue 
emerged by notifying the driving authorities, in the ab- 
sence of consent to discuss matters, and so indicated 
that selection. A number of respondents pointed out 
that public interest outweighed private rights of confi- 
dentiality. One doctor, without legal training, alluded 
to the fact that patients may well change medical at- 
tendants to achieve a positive outcome, irrespective of 
the action taken. Another doctor, without legal training, 
stated that in the past he had actually seized a patient’s 
car keys and given them to the police. 
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A dual-qualified doctor stated that discussion of the 
matter of concern with family/friends did not constitute 
breach of confidentiality and would achieve the desired 
outcome in an estimated 50% of cases. 
Respondents were also asked to define their approach 
to the situation where it was apparent that the patient 
would drive, contrary to medical advice, and 13/23 
stated that they would document the fact and would then 
advise the patient that a report would be provided to the 
driving authority contrary to the patient’s wishes. An 
additional 4/23 stated that they would advise the driv- 
ing authority without the patient’s knowledge while a 
further 4/23 would document the fact, advise the pa- 
tient that a report would be furnished, but would not 
proceed with the report against the patient’s will. Two 
respondents, both of whom practiced in both law and 
medicine, stated that they would document the fact and 
take no further action. The four respondents who in- 
dicated that they would threaten action, but would not 
proceed with it without consent, were dual qualified 
and included the other respondent who practised both 
as a lawyer and doctor. Of the four who would act with- 
out the patient’s knowledge, three were dual qualified 
and one had medical training, including fellowship of 
the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners. 
In response to the opportunity to provide extra 
commentary, one dual-qualified doctor indicated that 
he would document and advise without the patient’s 
knowledge even though he acknowledged that to 
openly notify against the patient’s will was a better 
option. He provided a commentary to say, 
you may ‘get away’ without the patient 
being aware who did it, 
when reporting a patient without the patient’s knowl- 
edge. Most other respondents, who indicated that they 
would notify with the patient’s knowledge, but against 
the patient’s consent, felt that this was the most compat- 
ible response to both medical ethics and public interest. 
The dual-qualified doctor from South Australia again 
referred to the legal requirements and hence indicated 
that there was no need to advise the patient that a report 
would be supplied as this was a mandatory procedure. 
Another dual-qualified doctor, who selected the option 
of notice without knowledge, indicated that ‘notifica- 
tion against consent’ was still a viable option but that 
the choice should be made on a case-by-case evalua- 
tion. The survey sought prioritisation and allowed for 
a single choice. One of the respondents, who practised 
both as a lawyer and doctor, emphasised the need for 
patient education regarding the reasons why driving 
was ill-advised. This was not the same respondent who 
earlier advocated more education but he concluded his 
remarks with the statement ‘be persuasive, not dictato- 
rial’ and he selected the option that dictated documen- 
tation without further action. 
Respondents were asked to nominate the appropriate 
charge to be imposed on a patient who killed someone 
as a consequence of driving, contrary to clear and doc- 
umented medical advice not to do so. In the responses 
lo/23 (five with dual qualification, including two who 
practised both as lawyers and doctors) nominated var- 
ious categories of murder (two: murder with intent to 
kill; two: murder with intent to cause grievous bod- 
ily harm; six: murder with reckless indifference to hu- 
man life). Five of this sub-group (including four with 
dual qualifications of whom two had dual practices) 
gave alternative lesser charges, including manslaugh- 
ter (even though the questionnaire sought a single re- 
sponse). 12/23 opted for categories of manslaughter 
(six: manslaughter with criminal negligence; three: 
manslaughter with unlawful or dangerous acts; three: 
manslaughter with subjective foresight as to the prob- 
ability of grievous bodily harm). Three respondents 
chose the charge of culpable driving, of whom two, 
with dual qualification, identified the absence of mens 
rea (guilty mind) as the reason for the lesser charge and 
one, with dual practice, did so because of the fact that 
a charge for murder or manslaughter could possibly 
indict the doctor as an accessory before the fact. One 
respondent, who practised both as a lawyer and doc- 
tor, opted for the alternative charge of ‘causing death 
by dangerous driving’, pointing out that there were 
state-by-state differences in the criminal justice sys- 
tem. The South Australian, dual-qualified doctor, com- 
mented that the penological options and approaches 
were ‘of much greater interest’ than the actual charge 
imposed. Another doctor, without legal training, was 
non-committal, indicating that the charges must depend 
upon the situation and cited emergency as mitigating 
circumstances. Two respondents, the sole lawyer and 
a dual qualified doctor, could not decide on the appro- 
priate charge. 
DISCUSSION 
The survey was conducted amongst those who attended 
the second academic seminar of the ACLM”. The 
ACLM was first formed in 1995 with a charter to bring 
together doctors who were also trained in law and who 
had significant experience in designated areas of le- 
gal medicine. This group was deemed ideal for the 
purposes of exploring the concepts of appropriate re- 
sponses to patients who failed to respect medical advice 
not to drive. It was further felt that the response to fail- 
ure to comply with medical advice was a necessary 
extension of the earlier study2. 
It is accepted that the sample size was small but that 
this was more than compensated for by the quality of 
the respondents, which included 14 doctors with for- 
mal qualifications in law, of whom three practised both 
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as lawyers and doctors. Some might contend that those 
with dual qualifications were trained only to the ba- 
sic levels of medicine and law but such an argument is 
quashed when it is revealed that 8/14 held post-graduate 
medical qualifications from a variety of specialist med- 
ical colleges thereby demonstrating the breadth of med- 
ical experience encompassed in this sample popula- 
tion. At the same time, 7/14 had more than basis le- 
gal qualifications, including master’s and honour’s de- 
grees, thereby indicating the significant quality of legal 
interpretation that was provided by this population. 
When comparing the training and approaches of doc- 
tors and lawyers it has been argued that each discipline 
provides the student with a different mode of examining 
any particular question . I2 It follows that the combina- 
tion of both qualifications should equip the person for a 
more competent and analytical assessment of medico- 
legal problems. It is with this backdrop of a rarefied, 
highly qualified sample of doctors, with training in le- 
gal medicine that the current survey was undertaken 
with the specific purpose of exploring questions of pro- 
fessional privilege, which lawyers take for granted but 
which is less entrenched within the practices of doc- 
tors. 
The majority of respondents, 20/23 supported the 
need for professional privilege for the doctor/patient 
relationship but a similar number 18/23, indicated that 
such a privilege should not be absolute. All but one 
(22/23) felt that doctors should have a right to re- 
port patients whom they felt posed a risk to the pub- 
lic interest. There appeared less agreement when the 
‘right’ became a ‘duty’ to report, and 14123 consid- 
ered such reporting to be a duty, although it was still 
a majority response, while 6/23 denied there existed 
such a duty. These figures were similar to the earlier 
survey regarding professional privilege2 but the ratio 
of those who supported the notion of reporting as a 
duty was considerably reduced (0.74 as compared to 
0.61). 
The situation in which reporting is obligatory has 
been previously reviewed6*‘T9* to and it is universally 
accepted that mandatory reporting of patients, to the 
driving authorities, carries with it a serious risk to un- 
dermine the doctor/patient relationship. It is argued that 
if the patient is fearful that the doctor may disclose sen- 
sitive information, then the patient may choose to be 
dishonest with the doctor, a situation which has the po- 
tential to compromise the delivery of optimal medical 
care. The opening quotation’ highlighted the ethical 
need to respect the confidential nature of medical re- 
lationships. Lord Denning13 encapsulated these views 
when he stated: 
The law of confidentiality depends on the 
broad principle of equity that he who has 
received information in confidence shall 
not take unfair advantage of it. He must 
not make use of it to the prejudice of him 
who gave it without seeking his consent. 
These sentiments were reinforced from the Cana- 
dian jurisdiction, from which is quoted the following 
passaget4, 
Members of the medical profession have a 
duty of confidentiality with respect to their 
patients. They are under restraint not to 
volunteer information respecting the con- 
dition of their patient or any professional 
services performed by them without their 
patient’s consent. In the absence of such 
consent, members of the medical profes- 
sion breach their duty if they disclose such 
information unless required to do so by 
due process of law. 
Chapman, at a recent forum of the Australian 
Medical Association (AMA) held in conjunction 
with the Australian Association of Practice Managers 
(AAPM)t5 stated: 
The ethical duty to keep secret anything 
learned in the course of treating a patient 
is also a legal duty on the basis that the law 
irnplies a term into the contract whereby a 
professional [person] is to keep [his or her] 
clients’ secrets and not to disclose them 
unto anyone without just cause. 
Chapman went on to define the exceptions such as: with 
the patient’s consent; by order of the court; (if a court 
orders a doctor to divulge information, as by subpoena, 
where failure to comply may be deemed contempt); 
disclosure to a colleague (as in the case of doctors dis- 
cussing case details); or in the public interest. 
Exploring public interest, as is relevant to later dis- 
cussions concerning disclosure, leads one to the Cal- 
ifornian case of Tarasoff v. The Regents of the Uni- 
versity of California 16. In this case, Mr Poddar killed 
Tatiana Tarasoff and Tarasoff’s parents successfully 
claimed that Poddar’s therapist was liable for failure 
to directly report a known risk to the potential victim, 
even though the therapist had alerted the police. In W 
v. Edge11 ” W was a patient held in a secure hospi- , 
tal, having shot and killed five people and wounded 
another two. After 10 years he sought less restrictive 
custody, or release, and Dr Edge11 was employed to 
prepare a report on W’s mental health. The report was 
unfavourable and W sought to suppress it by withdraw- 
ing his application for review. Recognising what was 
happening, Dr Edge11 released his report to the hospi- 
tal’s medical director, who subsequently sent a copy 
‘with Dr Edgell’s consent’ to the secretary of state. W 
sued Dr Edge11 for breach of confidentiality but the 
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Court of Appeal considered the exceptional circum- 
stances justified the limited disclosure as had occurred. 
The question emerged as to what would be justifiable 
had disclosure been more broadly based and comes 
to the heart of the question of confidentiality and the 
management of such patients. 
The latitude of what constitutes ‘exceptional circum- 
stances’ is not well-defined and hence the purpose of 
the additional questions, to seek guidance from this se- 
lect panel of doctors with legal training. Respondents 
were asked to nominate the appropriate response to a 
patient who may have uncontrolled epilepsy, but who 
may, or does, ignore the doctor’s advice against driv- 
ing. Where there was concern that a patient did not 
fully comprehend the gravity of the situation or the im- 
plications of the advice precluding driving, 7/23 would 
discuss the matter with family/friends in contravention 
to patient’s consent, and established ethical principles’. 
One doctor, without legal training, highlighted the ef- 
fectiveness of this approach and claimed that it would 
provide a 50% success rate. However, one cannot ig- 
nore that such action does breach the patient’s right 
to confidentiality and could result in an action, conse- 
quent to a breach of an implied term of contract be- 
tween the patient and doctor, as defined in the earlier 
quotation from Lord Denning’3. The patient may, if so 
inclined, seek a number of remedies if confidentiality is 
breached”, be it by contract law or the tort of medical 
negligence with failure of ‘duty of care’, which does 
include the provision of privacy. 
Professional privilege was the subject of a debate at 
the 21st International Epilepsy Congress (IEC)‘g~20. 
The debate focused upon the differences between the 
French legal system, in which medical-in-confidence is 
codified into the penal system*’ and the US jurisdiction 
in which a ‘right’ to report remains valid and a ‘duty’ 
to report may be implied from the Tarasoff case. The 
consensus of the current survey favoured a less rigid 
implementation of the right to override confidentiality. 
It may still prove difficult to justify discussion with 
the patient’s family/friends against that patient’s con- 
sent, when seeking a defence against a claim for breach 
of confidentiality, even with the advice provided by the 
respondent who indicated a 50% successful outcome. 
The risk of action, for breach of confidentiality, is 
less of a worry when it involves reporting to the driving 
authorities**, thereby supporting the actions of 17/23 
respondents. However, only 13/17 would fulfil the eth- 
ical requirement to advise the patient of the intended 
notification’. Only 6/23 indicated that they would abide 
by the wishes of the patient, if there appeared concern 
as to understanding of the reasons for doctors to advise 
against driving and of the six, all were dually quali- 
fied and three practised both as lawyers and doctors. 
It could be argued that the legal training may impose 
greater pressure upon the therapist to honour the ex- 
pectations of the patient (client), or alternatively that 
doctors (without legal training) were more likely to 
take unilateral decisive action once they had reached a 
decision as to the appropriateness of such an activity. 
This latter view is in concert with opinion regarding the 
different approaches adopted by lawyers and doctors’*. 
As stated by the South Australian respondent with dual 
qualification, who functioned in the state with man- 
dated reporting, there can be no ethical dilemma asso- 
ciated with reporting, irrespective of advice to or from 
the patient. 
Once it is clear that the patient will ignore advice to 
refrain from driving, the situation becomes more criti- 
cal. There is now an unequivocal foreseeable risk and it 
might be argued that the doctor has a dual ‘duty of care’, 
both to the patient and society. It may be argued that the 
doctor has no greater duty to society than does anyone 
else, such as a spouse, parent or knowing acquaintance 
although the counter proposition is that the doctor is in 
a better position to understand the foreseeable risk. 
Lord Atkins23 in Donoghue v. Stevenson stated, 
You must take reasonable care to avoid 
acts or omissions which you can reason- 
ably foresee would be likely to injure your 
neighbour. 
If it is known that the person poses a risk to society, 
then the doctor is arguably ‘duty-bound’ to act if the 
use of the word ‘you’ is directed towards the physician 
who is more than a mere observer. Lord Wilberforce, 
50 years after the statement by Lord Atkins, wrote24, 
the question has to be approached in two 
stages. First one has to ask . . . [is there] 
a sufficient relationship of proximity or 
neighbourhood such that, in the reason- 
able contemplation of the former, careless- 
ness on his part may be likely to cause 
damage to the latter . . . Secondly, if the 
first question is answered affirmatively, it 
is necessary to consider whether there are 
any considerations which ought to negate, 
or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty 
or the class of person to whom it is owed. 
The tempered response from the dual-qualified doctors 
would suggest that they perceived that the question of 
‘confdentiulify’ may well ‘negate’ the duty to report. 
It is clear, as is the case in most questions of legal 
opinion, that there are no absolute answers. This was 
encapsulated by Lord Oliveg5 who stated: 
In the end, it . . . depends more upon the 
Court’s perception of what is the reason- 
able area for the imposition of liability 
than upon any logical process of analyt- 
ical deduction. 
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Flemingz6 summed up the legal argument by stating 
In the decision whether to recognise a 
duty in a given situation, many factors in- 
terplay: the hand of history, our ideas of 
morals and justice, the convenience of ad- 
ministering the rule and our social ideas 
as to where the loss should fall. 
the Court. It would seem appropriate to advise patients 
that the option for a charge of murder, in these circum- 
stances, is a viable outcome if this is possible within 
the society in which the patient lives. 
The sample that was surveyed in this study, includ- 
ing a significant number of dual-qualified doctors and 
lawyers, determined that the right to report should be 
upheld, that most felt it was their duty to report and that 
they would do so, with, or without, consent from the 
patient, if they perceived a real threat to the community. 
The repeated comment of the need for education should 
not be overlooked. It is significant that the ACLM has 
been formed in Australia, which may find a role in such 
education. Similarly, one should not ignore the truism 
‘be persuasive, not dictatorial’ as this is the hallmark 
of the effective doctor/patient relationship, in which 
the patient should make the decisions, but be guided 
to make the right decisions, namely not to drive while 
there exists a real risk to injure self or others. Proper 
handling of this type of situation should avoid conflict 
and the potential for litigation. 
Perhaps the most alarming comment was the one 
provided by the respondent who suggested that if the 
patient was found guilty of murder, then the doctor, 
who failed to report that the patient posed a risk, may 
be found guilty of being an accessory before the fact. 
While it is freely acknowledged that this situation is 
purely hypothetical, it should still provide doctors with 
a cogent argument to notify authorities regarding pa- 
tients who do pose a risk, both to themselves and oth- 
ers within the community. Despite the fact that such 
a charge for the doctor is highly unlikely, one would 
have to conclude that this application is improbable 
rather than impossible. It is clear that society is plac- 
ing increasingly greater expectations upon the medical 
profession and with time, the improbable may become 
less so. 
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APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE 
At the 21st International Epilepsy Conference in Sydney, on 4 September 1995, there was a main topic which 
examined ‘Epilepsy and rhe Law’. One of the themes that was singled out for extra consideration was the issue of 
professional privilege as might exist between doctor and patient, similar to the privileged relationship that exists 
between lawyer and client. 
As part of that discussion members of the audience were asked to respond to a number of questions which will 
also be asked of those attending this scientific meeting of the Australian College of Legal Medicine. The response 
will then be compared with those that were provided for the earlier Sydney meeting. 
Preliminary questions 
1. Are you qualified as a Medical Practitioner? (Yes/No) 
If ‘Yes’, please state qualifications and year. 
19- 19- 19- 19- 
2. Are your formally trained in legal studies? (Yes/No) 
If ‘Yes’, please state qualifications and year. 
19- 19- 19- 19- 
3. If trained in both Law and Medicine, do you practice predominantly 
as (Choose only ONE response): (Doctor/Lawyer/Neither) 
(If neither, state main occupation) 
Should there be professional privilege between doctor and patient? 
Should medical professional privilege be absolute? 
Should the doctor have the right to notify the authorities of a foreseeable risk? 
Should the doctor have a duty to notify the authorities of a foreseeable risk? 
(Yes/No/Don’t know) 
(Yes/No/Don’t know) 
(Yes/No/Don’t know) 
(Yes/No/Don’t know) 
Make any comments you feel should be made re professional privilege in medical practice. 
Please select only ONE of the choices below and place a tick in the appropriate box. 
Confidentiality and patients with epilepsy 
Question 2 
467 
If a doctor has concerns about a patient’s fitness to drive, and the patient does not seem to understand the concerns, 
should the doctor: 
(a) Take no further action. [ 1 
(b) Discuss the matter with family members/friends and only do so with the patient’s consent. [ 1 
(c) Discuss the matter with family members/friends without the patient’s consent. [ 1 
(d) In the absence of consent to discuss the matter, simply report the patient to the driving authorities. 1 1 
Please comment on why you chose the selection above. 
Please select only ONE of the choices below and place a tick in the appropriate box. 
Question 3 
If it is apparent that a patient is going to drive contrary to medical advice, should the doctor: 
(a) Ignore the fact. 
(b) Document the fact and take no further action. 
(c) Document the fact and advise the patient that he/she will report the patient to the driving authorities, 
but not do so against the patient’s will. 
(d) Document the fact and advise the patient that he/she will report the patient to the driving authorities, 
and do so against the patient’s will. 
(e) Document the fact and report the patient to the driving authorities, without the patient’s knowledge. 
Please comment on why you chose the selection above. 
[ 1 
[ 1 
[ 1 
[ 1 
r 1 
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Please select only ONE of the choices below and place a tick in the appropriate box. 
Question 4 
If a patient drives a car, contrary to clear and documented medical advice against so doing, and as a result kills 
someone-should the patient be charged with: 
(a) Murder; 
-with intent to kill. 
-with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. 
-with reckless indifference to human life. 
-with constructive murder. 
(b) Manslaughter; 
-with criminal negligence. 
-with unlawful or dangerous acts. 
-with subjective foresight as to the possibility of death. 
-with subjective foresight as to the probability of grievous bodily harm. 
(c) Culpable driving; 
(d) Other, please specify. 
1 1 
[ 1 
[ 1 
[ 1 
[ 1 
[ 1 
[ 1 
[ 1 
[ 1 
Please comment on why you chose the selection above. 
